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Computing voting power in easy weighted voting games
Haris Aziz Mike Paterson
Abstract
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics,
political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They
model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision.
A coalition of agents is winning if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or
equals a specified quota. The Banzhaf index is a measure of voting power of an agent in
a weighted voting game. It depends on the number of coalitions in which the agent is the
difference in the coalition winning or losing. It is well known that computing Banzhaf indices
in a weighted voting game is NP-hard. We give a comprehensive classification of weighted
voting games which can be solved in polynomial time. Among other results, we provide a
polynomial (O(k(n
k
)k)) algorithm to compute the Banzhaf indices in weighted voting games in
which the number of weight values is bounded by k.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Background
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are mathematical models which are used to analyze voting bodies
in which the voters have different number of votes. In WVGs, each voter is assigned a non-
negative weight and makes a vote in favour of or against a decision. The decision is made if
and only if the total weight of those voting in favour of the decision is greater than or equal to
some fixed quota. Since the weights of the players do not always exactly reflect how critical a
player is in decision making, voting power attempts to measure the ability of a player in a WVG
to determine the outcome of the vote. WVGs are also encountered in threshold logic, reliability
theory, neuroscience and logical computing devices [15, 16]. Parhami [13] points out that voting
has a long history in reliability systems dating back to von Neumann [17]. For reliability systems,
the weights of a WVG can represent the significance of the components whereas the quota can
represent the threshold for the overall system to fail. WVGs have been applied in various political
and economic organizations [1, 2]. Voting power is also used in joint stock companies where each
shareholder gets votes in proportion to the ownership of a stock [8].
The Banzhaf index is considered the most suitable power index by voting power theorists [11, 7].
The computational complexity of computing Banzhaf indices in WVGs is well studied. Prasad and
Kelly [14] show that the problem of computing the Banzhaf values of players is #P-complete. It is
even NP-hard to identify a player with zero voting power or two players with same Banzhaf indices
[12]. Klinz and Woeginger [10] devised the fastest exact algorithm to compute Banzhaf indices in
a WVG. In the algorithm, they applied a partitioning approach that dates back to Horowitz and
Sahni [9]. However the complexity of the algorithm is still O(n22
n
2 ). In this paper, we restrict
our analysis to exact computation of Banzhaf indices instead of examining approximate solutions.
We show that although computing Banzhaf indices of WVGs is a hard problem in general, it is
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easy for various classes of WVGs, e.g., for WVGs with a bounded number of weight values, an
important sub-class of WVGs.
1.2 Outline
Section 2 provides the preliminary definitions of terms used in the paper. The outline of the
paper is as following. Section 3 identifies WVGs in which Banzhaf indices can be computed
in constant time. In Section 4, we examine WVGs with a bounded number of weight values,
and provide algorithms to compute the Banzhaf indices. Section 5 examines WVGs with special
weight distributions. Section 6 considers WVGs with integer weights. We conclude with some
open problems in the final section.
2 Preliminaries
We give definitions of key terms. The set of voters is N = {1, ..., n}.
Definitions 2.1. A simple voting game is a pair (N, v) with v : 2N → {0, 1} where v(∅) = 0,
v(N) = 1 and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . A coalition S ⊆ N is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing
if v(S) = 0. A simple voting game can alternatively be defined as (N,W ) where W is the set of
winning coalitions.
Definition 2.2. The simple voting game (N, v) where
W = {X ⊆ N,
∑
x∈X wx ≥ q} is called a weighted voting game. A weighted voting game is denoted
by [q;w1, w2, ..., wn] where wi is the voting weight of player i. Usually, wi ≥ wj if i < j.
Generally, 12
∑
1≤i≤nwi ≤ q ≤
∑
1≤i≤nwi so that there can be no two disjoint winning coalitions.
Such weighted voting games are termed proper.
Definitions 2.3. A player i is critical in a coalition S when S ∈ W and (S \ i) /∈ W . For each
i ∈ N , we denote the number of coalitions in which i is critical in game v by ηi(v). The Banzhaf
index of player i in weighted voting game v is βi =
ηi(v)∑
i∈Nηi(v)
. The probabilistic Banzhaf index, β
′
i
of player i in game v is ηi(v)/2
n−1. Coleman’s power of the collectivity to act, A, is defined as the
ratio of the number of winning coalitions w to 2n: A = w/2n.
The problem of computing the Banzhaf indices of a WVG can be defined formally as following:
Name: BI-WVG
Instance: WVG, v = [q;w1, ..., wn]
Question: What are the Banzhaf indices of the players?
3 Extreme cases
If the WVG v is [q;u, u, . . . , u︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
], then the Banzhaf indices β1, ... , βn are equal to 1/n. The Banzhaf
indices can be found in constant time, and the following theorem gives the actual number of swings
for each player.
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Theorem 3.1. In a WVG with n equal weights, u, each player is critical in
( n−1
⌈q/u⌉−1
)
coalitions.
Moreover, the total number of winning coalitions w is
∑n
i=⌈q/u⌉
(
n
i
)
.
Proof. The minimum number of players needed to form a winning coalition is ⌈q/u⌉. A player
is critical in a coalition if there are exactly ⌈q/u⌉ − 1 other players in the coalition. There are( n−1
⌈q/u⌉−1
)
such coalitions. There are
(n
i
)
coalitions of size i and such a coalition is winning if
i ≥ ⌈q/u⌉.
Also, in a WVG with n equal weights u, the probabilistic Banzhaf index of each player is then( n−1
⌈q/u⌉−1
)
/2n−1. We can also compute Coleman’s power of the collectivity to act, A, which is equal
to w2n .
A dictator is a player who is present in every winning coalition and absent from every losing
coalition. This means that the player 1 with the biggest weight is a dictator if and only if w1 ≥ q
and
∑
2≤i≤nwi < q. In that case, β1 = 1 and βi = 0 for all i > 1.
If 0 < q ≤ wn then the only minimal winning coalitions are all the singleton coalitions. So there are
n minimal winning coalitions and every player is critical in one coalition. Thus, for all i, βi = 1/n
and the Banzhaf indices can be found in constant time (i.e., O(1)). Moreover, the probablistic
Banzhaf index β
′
i = 1/2
n−1 for all i, and Coleman’s power of collectivity to act A = 2
n−1
2n
If q ≥
∑
1≤i≤nwi − wn, then the only minimal winning coalition is {1, 2, . . . , n} and it becomes
losing if any player gets out of the coalition. Thus the weighted voting game acts like the unanimity
game. Then for all i, βi = 1/n. The Banzhaf indices can be found in constant time (i.e., O(1)).
Moreover, for all i, β
′
i = 1/2
n−1 and A = 1/2n.
4 Bounded number of weight values
In this section we estimate the time complexity of several algorithms. We start off with the case
when all weights except one are equal and give exact formulas for the Banzhaf indices. We then
use this as a warm up exercise to consider more general cases where there are 2 weight values and
then k weight values.
4.1 All weights except one are equal
We start off with the case when all weights except one are equal.
Theorem 4.1. Let v be a WVG, [q;wa, wb, ..., wb], where there is wa and m weights of value wb,
where wb < q. Let x be ⌈
q−wa
wb
⌉ and y = ⌈q/wb⌉. Then the total number of coalitions in which a
player with weight wb is critical is
(m−1
y−1
)
+
(m−1
x
)
. Moreover, the number of coalitions in which the
player with weight wa is critical is
∑Min(y−1,m)
i=x
(m
i
)
.
Proof. A player with weight wb is critical in 2 cases:
1. It makes a winning coalition with other players with weight wb only. Let y be the minimum
number of players with weight wb which form a winning coalition by themselves. Thus
y = ⌈q/wb⌉. The number of such coalitions in which a player with weight wb can be critical
is
(
m−1
y−1
)
.
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2. It makes a winning coalition with the player with weight wa and none or some players with
weight wb. Let x be the minimum number of players with weight wb which can form a
winning coalition with the inclusion of the player with weight wa. Thus x = ⌈
q−wa
wb
⌉. Then,
the number of such coalitions in which a player with weight wb can be critical is
(m−1
x
)
.
The total number of swings for a player with weight wb is thus
(
m−1
y−1
)
+
(
m−1
x
)
.
The player with weight wa is critical if it forms a winning a coalition with some players with weight
wb but the coalition becomes losing with its exclusion. The player with weight wa can prove critical
in coalition with varying number of players with weight wb. The maximum number of players with
weight wb with which it forms a winning coalition and is also critical is y − 1 in case y ≤ m and
m in case y > m. Therefore the total number of coalitions in which the player with weight wa is
critical is
∑Min(y−1,m)
i=x
(m
i
)
.
4.2 Only two different weight values
Unlike Theorem 4.1, we do not give a short formula for the Banzhaf values in the next theorem.
However Theorem 4.2 considers a more general case than Theorem 4.1. As we shall we later
Theorem 4.1 provides us with an idea to consider the case of k weight values.
Theorem 4.2. For a WVG with n players and only two weight values, the Banzhaf indices and
numbers of swings can be computed in O(n2) time.
Proof. We look at a WVG, v = [q;wa, ...wa, wb, ...wb], where there are na players with weight wa
and nb players with weight wb. We analyse the situation when a player with weight wa proves
to be critical in a coalition which has i other players with weight wa and the rest with weight
wb. Then the minimum number of players with weight wb required is ⌈
q−(i+1)wa
wb
⌉. Moreover the
maximum number of players with wb is ⌈
q−iwa
wb
⌉−1. Therefore j, the number of players with weight
wb, satisfies the following inequality: x1(i) = ⌈
q−(i+1)wa
wb
⌉ ≤ j ≤ Min(⌈ q−iwawb ⌉ − 1, nb) = x2(i). Let
Ai =
(na−1
i
)
, and let Bi =
∑x2(i)
j=x1(i)
(nb
j
)
. We define, the maximum possible number of extra players
with weight a, to be maxa = Min(⌈q/wa⌉ − 1, na − 1). Then the total number of swings of the
player with weight wa is
∑maxa
i=0 AiBi. The total number of swings for a player with weight wb can
be computed by a symmetric method.
We can devise an algorithm (Algorithm 2) from the method outlined in the proof.
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Algorithm 1 SwingsFor2ValueWVG
Input: v = [q; (na, wa), (nb, wb)].
Output: Total swings of a player with weight wa.
1: swingsa ← 0
2: maxa← Min(⌈q/wa⌉ − 1, na − 1)
3: for i = 0 to maxa do
4: x1(i)← ⌈
q−(i+1)wa
wb
⌉
5: x2(i)← Min(⌈
q−i(wa)
wb
⌉ − 1, nb)
6: Ai ←
(
na−1
i
)
7: if x1(i) > nb then
8: Bi ← 0
9: else if x2(i) < 0 then
10: Bi ← 0
11: else
12: Bi ← 0
13: for j = x1(i) to x2(i) do
14: Bi ← Bi +
(nb
j
)
15: end for
16: end if
17: swingsa = swingsa +AiBi
18: end for
19: return swingsa
Algorithm 2 BIsFor2ValueWVG
Input: v = [q; (na, wa), (nb, wb)].
Output: Banzhaf indices, β = (βa, βb).
1: swingsa = SwingsFor2ValueWVG(v)
2: v′ = [q; (nb, wb), (na, wa)]
3: swingsb = SwingsFor2ValueWVG(v
′)
4: totalswings = naswingsa + nbswingsb
5: βa =
swingsa
totalswings
6: βb =
swingsb
totalswings
7: return (βa, βb)
The algorithm for 2 weight values serves as warm-up for the general case of k weight values in the
next section.
4.3 k weight values
Theorem 4.3. The problem of computing Banzhaf indices of a WVG with k possible values of the
weights is solvable in O(nk).
Proof. We can represent a WVG v with k weight classes as follows:
[q; (n1, w1), (n2, w1), ..., (nk , wk)]
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where ni is the number of players with weights wi for i = 1, . . . , k. Here, we extend Algorithm 2
to Algorithm 4 for k weight classes.
We can write v′ as [q; (1, w0), (n1−1, w1), ..., (nk , wk)] where w0 = w1. This makes it simpler to write
a recursive function to compute the number of swings of player with weight w0. Let Ai1,i2,...,im
be the number of swings for w0 where there are ij players with weight wj in the coalition for
1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Then
Ai1,i2,...,ik =
{ (
n1−1
i1
)
(Πkj=2
(nj
ij
)
) if q − w0 ≤
∑k
j=1 ijwj < q
0 otherwise.
Now for 1 ≤ m ≤ k,
Ai1,i2,...,im−1 =
∑
im
Ai1,i2,...,im.
Here the summation is taken over all values of im for which the contribution is non-zero. Explicitly,
this range is given by
Max(
⌈
q − w0 −
∑m−1
j=1 ijwj −
∑k
j=m+1 njwj
wm
⌉
, 0) ≤ im ≤ Min(
⌈
q −
∑m−1
j=1 ijwj
wm
⌉
− 1, nm).
The total number of swings of the player with weight w0 is then Aǫ.
Algorithm 3 SwingsForWVG
Input: v = [q; (n1, w1), (n1, w1), . . . , (nk, wk)].
Output: Total number of swings, swings0, of a player with weight w1.
1: w0 = w1
2: v′ = [q; (1, w0), (n − 1, w1), ..., (nk, wk)]
3: swings0 = Aǫ
4: return swings0
Algorithm 4 BIsFor-k-ValueWVG
Input: v = [q; (n1, w1), (n1, w1), . . . , (nk, wk)].
Output: Banzhaf indices, β = (β1, . . . βk).
1: swings1 = SwingsForWVG(v)
2: totalswings← 0
3: for i = 2 to k do
4: v = Swap(v, (n1, w1)(ni, wi))
5: swingsi = SwingsForWVG(v)
6: totalswings← totalswings+ niswingsi
7: end for
8: for i = 1 to k do
9: βi =
swingsi
totalswings
10: end for
11: return (β1, . . . βk)
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We note that the exact computational complexity of BI-WVG for a WVG with k weight values
is O(k(nk )
k) where (nk )
k ≥ n1 · · · nk. None of the algorithms presented for WVGs with bounded
weight values extends naturally for multiple weighted voting games.
5 Distribution of weights
5.1 Geometric sequence of weights, and unbalanced weights
Definition 5.1. An r-geometric WVG [q;w1, ..., wn] is a WVG where wi ≥ rwi+1 for i = 1, ..., n−1.
We observe that in a 2-geometric WVG (such as [q; 2n, 2n−1, ..., ]), for any target sum of a coalition,
we can use a greedy approach, trying to put bigger weights first, to come as close to the target
as possible. This greedy approach was first identified by Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry [6] for a
broader category of weighted voting games in which weights are unbalanced :
Definition 5.2. An unbalanced WVG is a WVG such that, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, wj > wj+1+wj+2...+wn.
Example 5.3. The game [22; 18, 9, 4, 2, 1] is an example of an unbalanced WVG where each weight
is greater than the sum of the subsequent weights.
Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry [6] showed that the greedy approach for unbalanced WVG with
integer weights can help to compute all Banzhaf indices inO(n). We notice that the same algorithm
can be used for an unbalanced WVG with real weights without any modification. In fact it is this
property of ‘geometric weights’ being unbalanced which is the reason that we can find suitable
coalitions for target sums so efficiently. We characterise those geometric sequences which give
unbalanced WVGs:
Theorem 5.4. If r ≥ 2 then every r-geometric WVG is unbalanced.
Proof. Let v be an r-geometric WVG. We prove by induction that wj > wj+1 + . . . + wn. This is
true for j = n. Suppose it is true for all i, j +1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since v is r-geometric, wj ≥ 2wj+1. But,
2wj+1 = wj+1 +wj+1 > wj+1 + wj+2 + . . . +wn. Therefore v is unbalanced.
Corollary 5.5. For an r-geometric WVG v where r ≥ 2, the Banzhaf indices of players in v can
be computed in O(n) time.
Proof. Since the condition of r ≥ 2 makes v an unbalanced WVG, then we can use the greedy
algorithm from [6] which computes the Banzhaf indices in O(n).
Definition 5.6. A WVG is a k-unbalanced WVG if, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, wj > wj+k + · · · + wn. So an
unbalanced WVG is ‘1-unbalanced’.
Note that an r-geometric WVG is 2-unbalanced when r ≥ 1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.61803... = ϕ, the golden ratio,
since then
1
r2
+
1
r3
+ · · · <
1
r(r − 1)
≤ 1 since r(r − 1) ≥ ϕ(ϕ − 1) = 1.
We check whether 2-unbalanced WVGs have properties similar to those of unbalanced WVGs.
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Example 5.7. Consider a WVG v with 2m players and weights
3m−1, 3m−1, . . . , 3j , 3j , . . . , 3, 3, 1, 1.
It is easy to see that
∑j−1
i=0 2 · 3
i < 3j , so the game is 2-unbalanced.
In the unbalanced game, for each target coalition sum, there is either one corresponding coalition
or none. This does not hold for 2-unbalanced WVGs. In Example 5.7 with target total 1+3+ · · ·+
3m−1 = 12(3
m − 1), there are exactly 2m coalitions which give this target, namely those coalitions
with exactly one player out of each equal pair.
We prove that even for the class of 2-unbalanced (instead of simply unbalanced WVGs) the problem
of computing Banzhaf indices becomes NP-hard.
Theorem 5.8. BI-WVG is NP-hard for the class of 2-unbalanced WVGs .
Proof. We will use a reduction from the following NP-hard problem:
Name: SUBSET SUM
Instance: z1, . . . , zm, T ∈ N.
Question: Are there xjs in {0, 1} so that
∑m
j=1 xjzj = T ?
For the reduction from SUBSET SUM, we scale and modify the weights from the WVG v of
Example 5.7. For any instance I = {z1, . . . , zm, T} of SUBSET SUM, we will define a game vI
with 2m+1 players. Let Z = 1+
∑m
j=1 zj , and we may assume that T < Z. Whereas v had pairs
of weights 3j , 3j for 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, in vI there is one “unit player” with weight 1 and 2m pairs of
players with weights 3jZ, 3jZ + zj for 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. The quota for vI is
1
2(3
m − 1)Z + T + 1.
The unit player has nonzero Banzhaf index if and only if there exists a coalition among the other
2m players with weight exactly 12(3
m− 1)Z+T . We will show that to determine this is equivalent
to answering the SUBSET SUM instance I, and so even this special case of BI-WVG is NP-hard.
In Example 5.7, it was necessary (and sufficient) for achieving the target total of 12(3
m−1) to take
exactly one player from each pair. In game vI , since
∑m
j=1 zj < Z, this is still a necessary condition
for achieving the total of 12(3
m − 1)Z + T , and whether or not there is such a selection achieving
the total is exactly the condition of whether there is a subset of the zjs which sums to T .
5.2 Sequential weights
Definition 5.9. The set of weights {w1, w2, ..., wn} is sequential if
wn|wn−1|wn−2...|w1,
i.e. each weight is a multiple of the next weight.
Example 5.10. [32; 20, 10, 10, 5, 1, 1, 1] is an example of a WVG with sequential weights.
Chakravarty, Goel and Sastry [6] show that Banzhaf indices can be computed in O(n2) time if
the weights are sequential and they satisfy an additional dominance condition. The diminance
conditions states that a weight in one weight class should be more than the sum of weights of any
subsequent weight class.
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Definition 5.11. Let d1 > d2 > · · · > dr be the distinct values of weights w1, . . . , wn of a
sequential set. Then dk = mkdk+1 where mk > 1, ∀k, 1 ≤ k < r. Let Nk = {i | wi = dk} and
nk = |Nk|. Then the dominance condition holds if mk > nk+1 ∀k, 1 ≤ k < r.
We now define the alternative dominance condition for WVGs.
Definition 5.12. Let d1 > d2 > · · · > dr be the distinct values of weights w1, . . . , wn of a
sequential set. Let Nk = {i|wi = dk} and nk = |Nk|. Then the alternative dominance condition
holds if ∀j ∈ Nk, 1 ≤ k < r, wj >
∑
{wp | p ∈ Ni, i > k}.
We provide an alternative dominance condition for weights which are not necessarily sequential.
It is easy to see that a 2-unbalanced WVG does not necessarily satisfy the alternative dominance
condition.
Definition 5.13. Let d1 > d2 > · · · > dr be the distinct values of weights w1, . . . , wn of a
sequential set. Let Nk = {i|wi = dk} and nk = |Nk|. Then the alternative dominance condition
holds if ∀j ∈ Nk, 1 ≤ k < r, wj >
∑
{wp | p ∈ Ni, i > k}.
Proposition 5.14. Suppose a WVG v satisfies the alternative dominance condition. Then for v,
BI-WVG has time complexity O(n2).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 10 in [6] where the proof is for a sequential WVG which obeys
the dominance condition. However we notice that since the argument in the proof can be made for
any WVG which satisfies the alternative dominance condition, the proposition holds for v.
6 Integer weights
When all weights are integers, other methods may become applicable.
6.1 Moderate sized integer weights
Matsui and Matsui [12] prove that a dynamic programming approach provides a pseudo-polynomial
algorithm to compute Banzhaf indices of all players with time complexity O(n2q). Since q is less
than
∑
i∈N wi, the Banzhaf indices can be computed in polynomial time if the weight sizes are
moderate.
6.2 Polynomial number of coefficients in the generating function of the WVG
A generating function is a formal power series whose coefficients encode information about a
sequence. Bilbao et al. [4] observe, for a WVG v = [q;w1, . . . , wn], that if the number of coalitions
for which a player i is critical is bi = |{S ⊂ N : v(S) = 0, v(S ∪ {i}) = 1}| =
∑q−1
k=q−wi b
i
k, where
bik is the number of coalitions which do not include i and with total weight k, then the generating
functions of the numbers {bik} are given by Bi(x) =
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 + x
wj) = 1 + bi1x + b
i
2x
2 + · · · +
biW−wix
W−wi. This was first pointed out by Brams and Affuso [5].
Example 6.1. Let v = [6; 5, 4, 1] be a WVG.
9
• B1(x) = (1 + x
4)(1 + x1) = 1 + x+ x4 + x5
The coalitions in which player 1 is critical are {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}. Therefore η1 = 3.
• B2(x) = (1+x
5)(1+x1) = 1+x+x5+x6 The coalition in which player 2 is critical is {1, 2}.
Therefore η2 = 1.
• B3(x) = (1 + x
5)(1 + x4) = 1 + x4 + x5 + x9
The coalition in which player 3 is critical is {1, 3}. Therefore η3 = 1.
Consequently, β1 = 3/5, β2 = 1/5 and β3 = 1/5.
The generating function method provides an efficient way of computing Banzhaf indices if the
voting weights are moderate integers. Bilbao et al. [4] prove that the computational complexity of
computing Banzhaf indices by generating functions is O(n2C) where C is the number of non-zero
coefficients in
∏
1≤i≤n(1 + x
wj). We note that C can be bounded by the sum of the weights but
the bound is not tight. C can be relatively small even if the weight values are exponential in n.
Therefore if aWVG has a generating function in which the number of non-zero terms is polynomial
in n, then the computational complexity of computing the Banzhaf indices is in P .
7 Open problems & conclusion
Table 1 contains a summary of the algorithms or complexity results for different classes of WVGs.
A&P refers to Aziz and Paterson. In this paper we have classified WVGs for which Banzhaf
indices can be computed in polynomial time. It would be interesting to identify further important
classes of WVGs which have less than exponential time complexity. The extensive literature on
the SUBSET-SUM problem should offer guidance here. It appears an interesting question to
analyse the expected number of terms in the generating function for sequential WVGs. Another
challenging open problem is to devise an algorithm to compute exactly the Banzhaf indices of a
general WVG in time complexity which is less than O(n22
n
2 ).
Table 1: Complexity of WVG classes
WVG Class R/Z Complexity Time Remarks
Class
General R/Z NP-Hard O(n21.415n) [10]
Unbalanced R/Z P O(n) [6]
k-Unbalanced(k ≥ 2) R/Z NP-Hard A&P [3]
Sequential with dominance R/Z P O(n2) [6]
Alternative dominance R/Z P O(n) A&P [3] + [6]
Bounded(k) #(weight values) R/Z P O(nk) A&P [3]
r-geometric R/Z P O(n) A&P [3] + [6]
Moderate integer weights Z P O(n2q) [12]
Moderate GF Z P O(n2C) [5], [4]
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